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1 Introduction
The Economist recently touted - with caution - Twitter as an e¤ective mechanism for government
transparency1. However, some skepticism must be preserved, as a confounding motive behind
Twitter adoption is that of government outreach. As Felten (2009) concisely states: "outreach means
government telling us what it wants us to hear; transparency means giving us the information that
we, the citizens, want to get." Not surprisingly, many Americans are convinced that the Internet
is simply a new venue for government propaganda (Smith and Rainie, 2008). We humor the cynics
and attempt to tease out these two motives using a simple cost-benet trade-o¤ that underlies the
adoption decisions2 of those in the 111th House of Representatives.
We use hand-collected data on the Twitter adoption decisions of members in the 111th House
of Representatives. Ultimately, the study nds that a representatives propensity to adopt in-
creases with the number bills he/she sponsored, which we argue is a proxy for the perceived benet
associated with government outreach through Twitter. When we look closer at the adoption de-
cisions across parties, we nd that the amount of support (from the 2008 election) matters for
Democrats, while the number of bills sponsored matters for Republicans. We take this general
nding as suggesting that Democrats and Republicans benet from Twitter in di¤erent ways. A
bolder claim from our study says that Democrats care about transparency, while Republicans care
about outreach.
Furthermore, we nd evidence that the benet associated with outreach is stronger for Republi-
cans who belong to committees with a number of Democratic Twitter adopters. What is the story
here? A representative who has sponsored a number of bills will want them to be passed by his/her
peers. By using Twitter to reach out to the internet community, a representative can generate
public support for certain policies, which in turn, can coerce ideological rivals to vote in favor of
their policies. This e¤ect should be most pronounced if a representatives ideological rivals are also
Twitter users.
Looking at the perceived benet associated with transparency, the estimates suggest that trans-
parency matter more for less experienced Democratic congressional members, than their seasoned
counterparts. Established politicians most likely have a loyal constituent base, while younger politi-
cians have no reputation or experience to fall back on. Therefore, those with less experience have a
stronger incentive to maintain communication channels with their constituents so as to build some
1See the article Sweet to Tweet. The Economist, May 8, 2010.
2The framework used here is similar to that of Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein (2005), who investigate the
relationship between location and internet adoption.
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level of trust.
Twitter is a recent micro-blogging craze in the burgeoning social media market3; by the end
of 2008, there were over 3 million Twitter users (Comm, 2010). The basic idea of Twitter is that
those who have accounts can write short messages (up to 140 characters) that can potentially be
read by thousands (or millions). That said, a Twitter users main objective is often to attract as
many followers as possible, and keeping existing followers interested in their Tweets by posting
compelling content. Unlike its most famous cousins, Facebook and Youtube, users cannot post
pictures or videos on their Twitter feeds; although, they can post links containing this content.
Twitter has outshined traditional blogs because of its ease and simplicity; no longer do bloggers
have to spend countless hours writing online content, when all they need is a few seconds to send a
Twitter post via Short Message Service (SMS)4 (McFedries, 2007). A Twitter user gets the most
benet by also following the content of others, as being a follower of a fellow Twitter user might
generate some reciprocity in followings. That said, some of the most popular Twitter accounts
are those who have many followers but only follow a handful of other accounts. Unlike the more
traditional form of Blogging, Twitter users rely on the technology to market themselves as a quality
brand, as opposed to a low cost way to generate advertising revenue. For example, the GOP Leader
John Boehner has over 25000 followers and was following over 12000 users as of May 28, 2010.
Preceding forms of social media include MySpace, Real Simple Syndication (RSS), Flickr, Face-
book and Youtube, launched in 2003, 1999, 2004, 2004 and 2005. MySpace and Facebook are
primarily social networking sites, although Facebook attracts mostly college educated people, while
MySpace is well known for its members belonging to the music and lm industry. Both have been
used as venues for naked self promotion. In fact, it has become common practice for employers to
evaluate job candidates by their social networking sites5. RSS allows Internet users to easily and
e¤ortlessly subscribe to their favorite Blogs, such as New York Times Freakonomics or Financial
Times Undercover Economist. Flickr and Youtube specialize in publishing user generated photos
and videos, respectively. They provide an easy way to share content that would otherwise be hard
to share due to their le sizes. Moreover, with the spread of high speed internet, online photo
albums and video streams are more accessible than ever. Successful and well known users in social
media are known for integrating and combining multiple sources to cross market their brand. Face-
book users can Tweet and share Youtube videos, Youtube users can include links to their MySpace
3See Comm (2010) for a complete list and description of available social media outlets.
4See McFedries (2007) for further details.
5See article Employers Look at Facebook Too. CBC News, June 20, 2006.
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videos for viewers who want more content and Facebook users can submit their Twitter messages
through a Facebook Application. Finally, Twitter is an e¤ective way of introducing a large audience
to the same users Blog. Drawing on popular culture, Apple super-fan iJustine and video Blogger
Kevjumba have successfully capitalized on multiple social media platforms to promote themselves
at viral levels.
2 Related literature
It should not be surprising that the role of Twitter in politics has been a topic of discussion in
political science. Note however that past research on the role of Twitter in U.S. politics has mostly
been descriptive and exploratory. Williams and Gulati (2010) and Lassen and Brown (2010) both
nd that Republicans have a greater propensity to adopt Twitter. This result is quite interesting,
given that President Obama, a Democrat, is a leading advocate of social media in politics. To some
extent, we build on this result and ask a deeper question about whether the underlying incentives
behind Twitter adoption di¤ers across party lines.
Although research about Twitter use in politics is relatively new in political science, this research
has become increasingly popular in other elds6. Virtually all of the past research is concerned
with answering the question: How is Twitter used?
Our work complements a recent paper by Golbeck, Grims and Rogers (2010) who analyze the
content of Tweets among all U.S. politicians and nd that 53% of all Twitter content generated
by them contains information, which they dene as statements that contains links, positions on
relevant issues, or resources; this nding contradicts the popular criticism that Twitter is simply
an online environment that incubates hipster narcissism (McFedries, 2007). While Golbeck, Grims
and Rogers(2010) results are interesting, they do not resolve the debate as to whether Twitter is
being used for outreach or transparency reasons. It is not obvious that information revelation is
used exclusively to portray honesty, or push some agenda.
The research on Twitter in politics is nested within existing research about the evolution of
congressional communication over time7. Their conclusions overwhelmingly point to the impor-
tance of the Internet and communication. To summarize, the Internet has improved interactions
between politicians and voters, and as a consequence, those who embrace the technology have seen
much success; with better communication, comes better mobilization of voters who support for a
6For instance, there is research on the content and conversations within Twitter (Honeycutt and Herring, 2009),
Twitter as word of mouth (Jansen et. al., 2009), and Twitters relationship with social networks (Java et. al., 2007;
Krishnamurthy, Gill, and Arlitt, 2008),
7To name a few, refer to Gulati (2004), Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) and Oleszek (2007).
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representatives agenda.
One may think of our work as extending that of Adler, Gent and Overmeyer (1998). In their
study, they characterize those politicians who adopt, and among adopters, who solicits constituent
casework. To some extent, the adoption of Internet shares a similar undertone with Twitter adop-
tion. Our nding that younger politicians benet more from transparency is similar to their nding
that younger politicians are more likely to "emphasize or solicit casework in their homepages more
than members who are electorally secure."
Social media in general has played an increasingly large role in politics around the world,
especially so after the Franking Commission8 permitted unrestricted use of social media in congress.
For example, Williams and Gulati (2009) nd that the percentage of active Facebook users among
candidates in the 2006 and 2008 elections increased from 17.8 to 69.9 percent. Other authors have
found that internet communications and social media matter in politics (Gibson et al, 2003; and
Smith and Rainie, 2008). Our paper takes as given that social media is relevant. During the 2008
Presidential race, Barack Obama devoted nearly 100 sta¤ just to maintain his image on social
media outlets9. Twitter also has the power of organizing large movements, such as the response of
Mir-Hossein Mousavis supporters to Irans disputed and controversial election outcome in 200910.
Social media has proved to be among the most important PR tools in modern politics, and continues
to do so. Perhaps the most tting quote to describe Twitter adoption in politics is by Ivor Tassell
of the Globe and Mail (September 4, 2008)11: "Like rats scurrying up the ropes before an ocean
liner departs, politicians have sharp noses for knowing when to hop aboard a trend."
3 Research framework
3.1 Data
Our cross-sectional sample of observations consists of all active congressmen and women of the
111th House of Representatives. To obtain detailed controls about each representative, we use a
combination of the information provided on their own personal websites, the Biographical Directory
of the United States Congress. Using these sources of information, we can nd out how long each
representative has been in o¢ ce, incumbency status, the state and district he/she represents, how
old they are, their gender, race, religion, education and previous occupation before serving the
public. We augment this information with data from the 2000 U.S. Census for the districts that
8Body of government that regulates Congressional Mass communication.
9See the article Sweet to Tweet. The Economist, May 8, 2010.
10See the article Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement. Time Magazine, June 17, 2009.
11The authors rst discovered this quote on the blog on Twitter analysis, http://blog.mastermaq.ca/.
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they represent, such as the population, median income and race distribution of their corresponding
districts.
For each representative, we are able to identify whether they use Facebook, Flickr, MySpace,
RSS, Twitter and/or Youtube12. We rst consult each representatives URL to see whether they
are on Twitter or not13. However, some representatives do not reveal this information on their
website. Therefore, to get a complete set of Twitter users in the 111th House of Representa-
tives, we also consult aggregating sites such as http://www.congressional140.com/tweeting.php or
http://tweetcongress.org/list. An online search is also conducted to identify some Twitter account
holders who are not listed on these sites14.
The data also contains information about which committee(s) each representative belongs to.
On average, each representative belongs to two committees. A representatives underlying interests
and experience are major determinants as to which committees he/she will end up in. Moreover,
each committee is chaired by a Democrat and has a ranked Republican member. Committees consist
of disproportionately more Democrats than Republicans, so as to reect the current proportion of
Democrats in the House of Representatives. Finally, there are a total of 23 committees, each with
a specic mandate and jurisdiction, that a representative can potentially be a member of.
From the Clerk for the House of Representatives, we obtain information about each represen-
tatives percentage of votes in the most recent 2008 election, as well as the number of bills that the
representative has sponsored during the 111th session.
3.2 Empirical methodology
When each representative has to make a decision as to adopt Twitter or not, costs and benet must
be weighed. We will observe a representative adopting Twitter if and only if the net benet, benet
minus cost, exceeds zero. It is natural to consider a simple probit model of adoption, where the
latent utility is equal to the net benet and some idiosyncratic noise. We now argue that certain
variables in our data can be used to proxy for the latent utility, either through benet or cost.
3.2.1 Perceived benet of adoption
We stipulate that the main factors in the perceived benets of Twitter adoption are peer e¤ects,
outreach and/or transparency. Peer e¤ects can increase the benet of adopting Twitter, either
12All of this information was collected on the same day.
13We are also able to identify when they adopted Twitter by observing the date of their rst Twitter post.
14Some care is taken in this procedure, as searches occasionally generated potentially fake Twitter accounts under
the name of certain representatives. To avoid this dubious information, we only consider those representatives who
have veried Twitter accounts.
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through network or learning channels. As more of a representatives peers are also Twitter users,
the utility associated with adopting Twitter also increases, as Twitter allows users to interact
with one another through user-to-user replies. Alternatively, the amount of adoption among peers
may yield a favorable signal about uncertain merit regarding Twitters e¤ectiveness as a political
marketing tool. The amount of peer adoption is measured by the percentage of peer adopters,
where peers are dened by social networks formed by common committees that representatives
belong in15.
Transparency is meant to keep each representative honest. Voters will reward those politicians
they deem as being the most trustworthy. A representative who won the most recent election by a
large margin has only a valuable reputation to lose. Therefore, Twitter gives each representative
a public venue to share intimidate details about daily activities. A politician who has strong
constituent support has an incentive to stay connected with his/her followers so as to maintain
transparency. In this case, the percentage of votes from the 2008 election serves as a proxy for the
strength of constituent support.
Alternatively, government outreach allows a politician to control the information that is released
to his/her constituents. To some extent, a politicians brand can be protected or augmented through
outreach. A member of congress who has sponsored a large number of bills will have a greater
incentive to use Twitter as a way to push his/her political agenda by feeding the public mediated
information. Reaching the public in this "grass-roots" manner may be especially important when
the representative needs public support for his/her policy initiatives. Therefore, we use the number
of sponsored bills during the 111th session as a proxy for the benet associated with outreach.
3.2.2 Perceived cost of adoption
As with the adoption of any technology, there are adoption costs. These costs, however, may be
lower for representatives with prior knowledge or experience about social media; in particular, if
15 In a similar manner as Cohen and Malloy (2010) -to avoid identication of peer e¤ects o¤ of social network size
- we dene
percentage_same_party_adoptersi =
number_same_party_adoptersi
number_same_party_peersi
where number_same_party_adoptersi is a count of the number of same party adopters in the same committees as
i, while number_same_party_peersi is a count of the number of same party members in the same committees as
i. To control for exogenous committee characteristics, we also include
percentage_same_party_peersi =
number_same_party_peersi
number_peersi
where number_peersi is the size of is committee social network. We include exogenous committee characteristics
so as to control for contextual peer e¤ects (Manski, 1993). Refer to Manski (2000) for further details about the
identication of peer e¤ects.
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they have had experience with similar social media outlets such as Facebook, Flickr, MySpace,
RSS and/or Youtube. Given the close similarities between Facebook and Twitter, our prior is that
Facebook serves as the best proxy for social media familiarity.
The use of Twitter is not free of opportunity costs, as posting Twitter messages uses up a
representatives own time, or his/her sta¤er resources. Their opportunity cost should especially
large if they belong to a number of committees. Time spent away from committee duties can have
serious consequences on important policy decisions, especially so if a representative is a chair.
4 Main results
Our results suggest that Twitter adoption is driven by both cost and benet considerations. The
proxies for MySpace, RSS, Flickr, Facebook and Youtube adoption have positive e¤ects on the
adoption of Twitter, especially so for Facebook. This result supports our hypothesis that those
politicians who are tech-savvy face lower adoption costs than those who are not. Members of
congress who belong to a large number of committees and/or are committee chairs are less likely
to adopt Twitter, which suggests an opportunity cost associated with Twitter use.
A major benet associated with Twitter is driven by peer e¤ects16. The percentage of own
party adopters within a committee network has a marginal e¤ect of 1.02 (0.35). Using the entire
sample, we nd that the number of bills has a positive and signicant inuence on the propensity to
adopt, while the percentage of 2008 votes does not matter. At rst glance, this result suggests that
outreach outweighs transparency when representatives formulate the benets of adopting Twitter.
However, if we repeat the cost-benet analysis across party lines, we get a rather di¤erent picture.
The marginal e¤ect17 of the percentage of votes in 2008 is 0.58 (0.27) for Democrats, while it
is 0.17 (0.48) for Republicans. This result supports the conjecture that the benet associated with
communicating with ones own constituents is largest for Democrats. Outreach serves as a more
important benet to Republicans, as the marginal e¤ect associated with the number of bills is 0.01
(0.0044) as opposed to 0.003 (0.0024) for Democrats. Furthermore, we see that the marginal e¤ect
of the percentage of own party adopters within a committee network is 1.17 (0.52) for Republicans,
and 1.50 (0.77) for Democrats, which suggests that peer e¤ects impact adoption decisions across
party lines.
A large concentration of Twitter adoption occurred around January 200918, which is the time
16Peer e¤ects may materilize through network or learning e¤ects. Investigating this further is beyond the scope of
this paper. Our companion paper demonstrates that these peer e¤ects are related to social learning.
17Standard errors in parenthesis.
18Refer to the histograms in the appendix.
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in which a number of new sta¤ers began to work for the representatives. This exogenous event may
bias our estimates for the bills e¤ect upwards, as the sta¤ers likely assist in both the initiation of
bills, as well as activity on Twitter. We attempt to control for this event by repeating the probit
estimations, except omitting those representatives who adopted Twitter 100 days before or after
January 20, 2009. Even after controlling for this event, the e¤ect that the number of bills has on
the rate of adoption is still signicant, and especially so for Republicans.
4.1 Extensions
Two follow up questions naturally arise: 1) How does the benet associated with outreach accrue?
and 2) Who benets the most from transparency? Answering these questions will provide us a
deeper understanding about the latent incentives behind Twitter adoption.
We demonstrate that, at least for Republicans, the rate of adoption is higher if a representative
has sponsored a large number of bills and belongs to committees with a large proportion of De-
mocratic Twitter adopters19. The benet associated with outreach is substantial if Twitter can be
used to garner public support for certain policies, which in turn, generates support from political
rivals. This benet should be especially pronounced if a large percentage of rivals are also Twitter
users, who consequently are more likely pay attention to peersTwitter activity.
To answer the second question, we focus on the interaction between the number of votes and
a representatives experience. One may conjecture that transparency is most important to unsea-
soned politicians - in their expansionist stage - who have the most to prove, as their experienced
counterparts have years of experience - in their protectionist stage - and success to help generate
the publics trust. The estimates from our sub-sample of Democrats certainly support this story,
as the positive e¤ect on adoption associated with the number of past votes in 2008 is smaller for
more experienced politicians20. Indeed, the incentive to maintain open communication channels
with constituents is strongest for younger politicians. In some sense, this result is analogous to
Adler, Gent and Overmeyers (1998) nding that younger (Democratic) politicians are more likely
to adopt websites that contain their openness towards constituent casework. However, contrary to
their study, representatives who adopt Twitter are electorally secure.
19This assertion is made after calculating the marginal e¤ects using the Ai and Norton (2003) technique.
20As before, this assertion is made after calculating the marginal e¤ects using the Ai and Norton (2003) technique.
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5 Concluding remarks
Our study uncovers heterogeneity in the benets of Twitter adoption across political parties, which
leads us to conclude that transparency matters for Democrats, while outreach matters for Repub-
licans. We later show that the perceived benet of outreach is related to the impact it could have
in inuencing political rivals who are also on Twitter, while the perceived benet of transparency
is related to a representatives experience. In general, this paper provide additional insight into the
recent popular culture debate about Twitters relevance in e¤ective government communication,
using a standard model of innovation adoption along with hand-collected data.
This study falls short of identifying the role that constituents play in social media. Even if the
motivation behind Twitter adoption is related to transparency, there is no guarantee that politicians
will use the Twitter activity of their constituents beyond the scope of information gathering. While
we are certain that politicians keep track of their constituentsTweets, we are uncertain whether
these Tweets have any inuence on important legislature. For this reason, we (and other researchers)
are eagerly waiting for the public release of the Library of Congressarchived Twitter data so as
to paint a clearer picture about the interactions between constituents and representatives á la
Twitter21.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Detailed data description
A list of the variables and short descriptions for each are provided below:
1. The variables log(Population), log(Income) and the percentage of black residents are based
on the population numbers from the 2000 U.S. Census (as this study was conducted before
the 2010 Census).
2. Personal information about each candidate, such as gender, race, education, age, tenure,
party a¢ liation, profession and religion were collected using a combination of the directory of
representatives, their personal websites, and Wikipedia. Information common to all sources
were cross referenced with one another to ensure that the accuracy of our information was not
dependent on the source. The information about education and past occupation are based
on the representatives most recent degree and professions. We categorize education and pro-
fession using two dummy variables, a dummy that indicates whether the representative went
to an Ivy League school, and another dummy that indicates whether the representative was
an attorney, judge or lawyer. Furthermore, we categorize religion using a dummy indicating
whether a candidate is Catholic or not. A representatives tenure is based on the number of
years he/she has been in o¢ ce as a representative in the House of Representatives. We do
not count past experience in state level politics towards our measure of tenure.
3. MySpace, RSS, Flickr, Facebook, and/or Youtube use are indicated on each representatives
personal homepage. Because of the amount of identity theft in social media, we do not
indicate that a representative adopted a particular technology, unless it is explicitly stated on
their website; even if an Internet search produces a Facebook link to that representative. On
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the other hand, we are able to use both the representatives endorsement within a homepage
as well as Internet searches to identify Twitter use because of Twitters "veried" feature,
which ensures that the online persona corresponds to its true corresponding identity. The
date of the rst Twitter post was collected by going to each users rst page of posts and
recording the date of the earliest one.
4. Voting data from 2008 was collected from http://clerk.house.gov/. The variable party votes
corresponds to the percentage of votes in favor of the presidential candidate corresponding
to the representatives party loyalties. The percentage of votes in favor of the representative
himself/herself is captured by the variable representative votes.
5. Each representative belongs to as few as 0 and as many as 4 committees. We identify which
committees each representative belongs to by going to each committees website and looking
up its membership. The committees that we consider are the committees on agriculture,
appropriations, armed service, budget, education, energy, nancial services, foreign relations,
homeland security, house administration, economic, taxation, judiciary, natural resources,
oversight, intelligence, rules, science and technology, small business, o¢ cial conduct, trans-
portation and infrastructure, and ways and means.
6. We include the number of bills sponsored by each representative in our analysis. This infor-
mation is obtained for the 111th House of Representatives (2009-2010). Furthermore, we can
also identify all representatives that are chairs or ranked members of committees. The data
was collected on June 11, 2010.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Twitter adoption 0.418 0.494 0 1 438
log(Population) 13.364 0.214 10.96 15.2 438
log(Income) 10.643 0.262 9.620 11.43 438
Percentage black 12.637 15.963 0 96.400 438
Gender 0.167 0.373 0 1 438
Black 0.082 0.275 0 1 438
Catholic 0.292 0.455 0 1 438
Law 0.352 0.478 0 1 438
Ivy league school 0.098 0.298 0 1 438
Age 57.333 10.16 28 86 438
Incumbent 0.861 0.347 0 1 438
Tenure 9.550 8.711 0 54 438
Democrat 0.598 0.491 0 1 438
Party votes 0.516 0.1 0 0.96 432
Representative votes 0.656 0.125 0.27 1 427
Number of committees 1.936 0.826 0 4 438
MySpace 0.014 0.116 0 1 438
RSS 0.573 0.495 0 1 438
Flickr 0.151 0.358 0 1 438
Facebook 0.571 0.496 0 1 438
Youtube 0.731 0.444 0 1 438
Bills 18.018 12.45 0 96 438
Chair 0.103 0.304 0 1 438
Percentage same party adopters 0.403 0.182 0 0.889 438
Percentage other party adopters 0.461 0.189 0 0.889 438
Percentage same party peers 0.512 0.148 0 1 438
Percentage other party peers 0.459 0.142 0 0.697 438
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Table 2: Baseline probit regression results. Column (1) contains the full set of observation. Column
(2) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Democratic party, while column
(3) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Republican party.
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Democrat Republican
log(Population) 0.372 (1.593) 2.420 (2.546) -3.065 (2.181)
log(Income) 0.171 (0.314) 0.722 (0.454) -0.503 (0.535)
Percentage black 0.00491 (0.00557) -0.00201 (0.00762) 0.0250 (0.0142)
Gender 0.165 (0.178) -0.0762 (0.233) 0.904 (0.394)
Black -0.582 (0.342) -0.370 (0.421)
Catholic 0.0492 (0.161) 0.0703 (0.209) -0.255 (0.293)
Law -0.0613 (0.149) 0.0511 (0.206) -0.218 (0.238)
Ivy league school 0.383 (0.227) 0.465 (0.263) 0.549 (0.527)
Age -0.0120 (0.00821) -0.00288 (0.0111) -0.0229 (0.0154)
Incumbent -0.376 (0.234) -0.355 (0.305) -0.561 (0.434)
Tenure -0.00910 (0.0115) -0.0112 (0.0139) -0.00549 (0.0206)
Democrat -0.474 (0.549)
Party votes -0.0695 (0.688) -0.498 (0.904) -1.409 (1.337)
Representative votes 1.236 (0.657) 1.869 (0.863) 0.444 (1.285)
Number of committees -0.132 (0.104) -0.0628 (0.159) -0.168 (0.156)
MySpace 1.099 (0.726) -0.316 (0.661)
RSS 0.264 (0.146) 0.466 (0.196) -0.0834 (0.241)
Flickr 0.407 (0.187) 0.237 (0.258) 0.579 (0.295)
Facebook 0.709 (0.154) 0.929 (0.214) 0.521 (0.257)
Youtube 0.0744 (0.183) 0.102 (0.236) 0.273 (0.351)
Bills 0.0144 (0.00577) 0.00926 (0.00775) 0.0281 (0.0118)
Chair -0.186 (0.246) -0.177 (0.360) -0.128 (0.356)
Percentage same party adopters 2.625 (0.907) 4.831 (2.473) 3.124 (1.398)
Percentage other party adopters 0.762 (0.695) 0.112 (1.227) 1.078 (1.497)
Percentage same party peers -1.465 (0.822) -2.099 (1.128) -4.358 (3.719)
Percentage other party peers -1.925 (1.096) -1.625 (2.113) -0.980 (1.801)
Constant -6.981 (21.42) -41.65 (34.44) 48.22 (30.21)
Observations 427 249 175
McFadden R2 0.222 0.192 0.206
BIC 616.6 380.0 315.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 3: Probit regression results using a sub-sample of representatives who did not adopt Twitter
a 100 days before and after January 20, 2009. Column (1) contains the full set of observation.
Column (2) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Democratic party,
while column (3) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Republican party.
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Democrat Republican
log(Population) 0.674 (2.159) 3.417 (2.826) -7.397 (4.261)
log(Income) 0.0263 (0.357) 0.320 (0.523) -0.756 (0.842)
Percentage black 0.00511 (0.00651) -0.000963 (0.00831) 0.0273 (0.0153)
Gender 0.312 (0.215) 0.101 (0.268) 1.319 (0.596)
Black -0.506 (0.400) -0.261 (0.474)
Catholic 0.137 (0.189) 0.259 (0.240) 0.0991 (0.471)
Law -0.167 (0.176) 0.0237 (0.232) -0.918 (0.365)
Ivy league school 0.421 (0.269) 0.478 (0.308) 1.339 (0.757)
Age -0.0136 (0.00945) -0.0107 (0.0128) -0.0118 (0.0190)
Incumbent -0.452 (0.290) -0.400 (0.356) -0.965 (0.608)
Tenure 0.00363 (0.0131) 0.00348 (0.0165) 0.0228 (0.0274)
Democrat -0.596 (0.619)
Party votes -0.327 (0.810) -0.258 (1.230) -2.384 (2.164)
Representative votes 1.081 (0.788) 1.475 (0.982) 1.371 (1.838)
Number of committees -0.0968 (0.119) -0.0177 (0.178) 0.0581 (0.226)
MySpace 0.899 (0.859) -0.108 (0.775)
RSS 0.302 (0.171) 0.414 (0.218) 0.233 (0.391)
Flickr 0.488 (0.223) 0.429 (0.288) 0.454 (0.629)
Facebook 0.712 (0.190) 0.921 (0.267) 1.257 (0.448)
Youtube 0.0536 (0.215) 0.138 (0.273) -0.487 (0.511)
Bills 0.0188 (0.00659) 0.0111 (0.00900) 0.0546 (0.0161)
Chair -0.279 (0.260) -0.245 (0.390) -0.0502 (0.481)
Percentage same party adopters 2.083 (1.095) 6.137 (2.796) 2.465 (2.054)
Percentage other party adopters 0.848 (0.766) -0.0149 (1.333) 0.938 (2.193)
Percentage same party peers -1.387 (0.899) -2.762 (1.298) -6.956 (5.098)
Percentage other party peers -1.865 (1.305) -1.676 (2.309) 0.349 (2.434)
Constant -9.549 (29.22) -50.69 (38.19) 107.1 (59.19)
Observations 341 221 99
McFadden R2 0.196 0.204 0.295
BIC 482.0 310.6 200.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
16
Table 4: How does the benet associated with government outreach accrue through Twitter adop-
tion? Column (1) contains the full set of observation. Column (2) uses only the subset of rep-
resentatives who are members of the Democratic party, while column (3) uses only the subset of
representatives who are members of the Republican party.
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Democrat Republican
log(Population) 0.358 (1.592) 2.426 (2.541) -2.839 (2.163)
log(Income) 0.165 (0.314) 0.717 (0.454) -0.521 (0.532)
Percentage black 0.00491 (0.00555) -0.00193 (0.00762) 0.0204 (0.0141)
Gender 0.170 (0.179) -0.0732 (0.234) 0.787 (0.388)
Black -0.565 (0.341) -0.362 (0.419)
Catholic 0.0488 (0.161) 0.0711 (0.209) -0.237 (0.301)
Law -0.0606 (0.149) 0.0528 (0.205) -0.217 (0.240)
Ivy league school 0.375 (0.227) 0.458 (0.265) 0.506 (0.528)
Age -0.0121 (0.00823) -0.00296 (0.0112) -0.0206 (0.0158)
Incumbent -0.379 (0.234) -0.358 (0.305) -0.538 (0.437)
Tenure -0.00895 (0.0115) -0.0110 (0.0140) -0.0126 (0.0209)
Democrat -0.518 (0.557)
Party votes -0.0443 (0.691) -0.488 (0.904) -1.567 (1.335)
Representative votes 1.244 (0.656) 1.874 (0.860) 0.389 (1.347)
Number of committees -0.131 (0.103) -0.0624 (0.159) -0.209 (0.158)
MySpace 1.088 (0.723) -0.205 (0.666)
RSS 0.261 (0.147) 0.465 (0.196) -0.0972 (0.241)
Flickr 0.405 (0.187) 0.241 (0.258) 0.604 (0.292)
Facebook 0.712 (0.155) 0.927 (0.214) 0.473 (0.259)
Youtube 0.0768 (0.183) 0.104 (0.237) 0.215 (0.355)
Bills 0.0194 (0.0140) 0.0138 (0.0236) -0.0891 (0.0643)
Chair -0.187 (0.246) -0.188 (0.366) -0.0949 (0.363)
Percentage same party adopters 2.564 (0.917) 4.827 (2.474) 2.736 (1.444)
Percentage other party adopters 0.979 (0.899) 0.275 (1.443) -3.349 (2.999)
Percentage same party peers -1.425 (0.822) -2.076 (1.130) -3.171 (3.754)
Percentage other party peers -1.922 (1.096) -1.599 (2.110) -1.504 (1.800)
Bills * Percentage other party adopters -0.0103 (0.0270) -0.00782 (0.0386) 0.418 (0.222)
Constant -6.804 (21.40) -41.80 (34.40) 46.91 (29.82)
Observations 427 249 175
McFadden R2 0.222 0.192 0.220
BIC 622.5 385.5 317.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 5: Who benets the most from transparency? Column (1) contains the full set of observation.
Column (2) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Democratic party, while
column (3) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Republican party.
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Democrat Republican
log(Population) 0.441 (1.589) 2.605 (2.530) -3.079 (2.181)
log(Income) 0.156 (0.314) 0.717 (0.453) -0.495 (0.533)
Percentage black 0.00442 (0.00558) -0.00353 (0.00761) 0.0263 (0.0145)
Gender 0.149 (0.179) -0.128 (0.240) 0.882 (0.396)
Black -0.552 (0.337) -0.297 (0.413)
Catholic 0.0608 (0.161) 0.0792 (0.212) -0.278 (0.297)
Law -0.0415 (0.150) 0.0844 (0.208) -0.251 (0.248)
Ivy league school 0.373 (0.226) 0.452 (0.264) 0.513 (0.520)
Age -0.0119 (0.00821) -0.00292 (0.0112) -0.0239 (0.0156)
Incumbent -0.484 (0.242) -0.641 (0.319) -0.500 (0.440)
Tenure 0.0536 (0.0445) 0.129 (0.0639) -0.0686 (0.0912)
Democrat -0.403 (0.557)
Party votes -0.0483 (0.688) -0.610 (0.913) -1.383 (1.340)
Representative votes 2.066 (0.939) 3.589 (1.187) -0.553 (1.866)
Number of committees -0.136 (0.103) -0.0675 (0.158) -0.159 (0.156)
MySpace 1.072 (0.729) -0.296 (0.654)
RSS 0.254 (0.147) 0.421 (0.197) -0.100 (0.243)
Flickr 0.405 (0.188) 0.254 (0.262) 0.607 (0.304)
Facebook 0.704 (0.154) 0.931 (0.213) 0.536 (0.257)
Youtube 0.0863 (0.183) 0.116 (0.235) 0.264 (0.352)
Bills 0.0141 (0.00577) 0.00930 (0.00782) 0.0300 (0.0123)
Chair -0.201 (0.246) -0.325 (0.376) -0.140 (0.356)
Percentage same party adopters 2.715 (0.921) 5.556 (2.534) 3.032 (1.405)
Percentage other party adopters 0.665 (0.705) -0.0304 (1.262) 1.206 (1.527)
Percentage same party peers -1.484 (0.826) -2.185 (1.136) -4.343 (3.719)
Percentage other party adopters -1.932 (1.098) -2.021 (2.118) -0.990 (1.801)
Representative votes * tenure -0.0921 (0.0647) -0.196 (0.0888) 0.102 (0.141)
Constant -8.209 (21.38) -44.82 (34.25) 48.89 (30.24)
Observations 427 249 175
McFadden R2 0.224 0.205 0.208
BIC 621.2 381.4 320.3
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Figure 1: Concentration of Twitter adoption around the date January 20, 2009.
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Figure 2: Concentration of Twitter adoption around the date January 20, 2009 across parties.
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